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Paradoxically, the Uniform Business Corporation Act contains
no provision in regard to this problem.
By the doctrine prevailing in Massachusetts and Wisconsin, in
the absence of express statutory restrictions, corporations may pur-
chase their own shares in good faith out of capital, provided this is
done without prejudice to rights of existing creditors or discrimina-
tion against other shareholders.2 ' Seemingly, the decision of the
Wildermuth case is in accord with this general policy, and com-
pletes the anomolous metamorphosis through which the Ohio law
has passed. Time forbids a discussion of the merits of this policy.
Suffice it is to say that it has been "viewed with alarm" by a goodly
number of critics, the principal objection being that it constitutes
a withdrawal of assets in favor of the selling shareholder to the
possible serious prejudice of creditors and remaining shareholders."
R. D. K.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
MAINTENANCE OF A BASTARD CHILD - INTERPRETATION
OF OHIO GENERAL CODE, SECTION 12123
The Probate Court adjudged the defendant the putatiVe father
of a bastard child and ordered him to pay a reasonable sum for its
support an maintenance, such weekly payments to begin at the date
of adjudication. From this judgment the mother appealed to the
Court of Appeals, contending that the weekly payments should begin
at the date of birth of the child, some ninetetn months prior to the
date of adjudication. Held: Affirmed. The judgment given was
the only one permissible under a strict interpretation of section
12123, Ohio G. C. One judge dissented.- State ex rel Griffin v.
Zimmerman, 67 Ohio App. 272, 21 Ohio 0. 253 (i94I).
A review of the development of the Bastardy Act is necessary
"Barrett v. W. A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N. E. 765 (1931);
Scriggins v. Thomas Dolby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N. E. 749 (1935); Spiegel v. Beacon
Participations Inc. et a!, 297 Mass. 398, 8 N. E. (2d) 895 (1937); Koepler v. Crocker
Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N. V. 130 (1930); Rasmussen v. Schweizer, 194 Wis. 362,
216 N. V. 481 (1927); also see Grace Securities Cori. v. Roberts, 138 Va. 792, 164 S. E.
700 (1932). C. F. Boggs v. Fleming, 66 Fed. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 1933).
=See Nussbaum, Acquisition by a CorporatioA of Its Own Stock, (1935) 35 COL. L.
Rev. 911; Levy, Purchase by an English Company of Its Shares. (1930) 79 U. PA. L.
Rav. 43; WAREz, Progress of the Law: Corporations, (1921) 34 HARV. L. RZv. 282. 293;
Levy, op. cit. supra, note 20.
'Crow, J., dissented.
NOTES IU(
to interpret Ohio G. C. Sec. 12123, as it now stands. At common
law the reputed father was under no legal duty to maintain his
illegitimate child.2  Ohio's first Bastardy Act rejected the common
law and provided that the putative father "shall stand charged with
the maintenance" of the bastard child "in such sum or sums as the
court shall order and direct." 3 The purpose of this early legislation
was to compel the putative father to perform his moral obligation,
namely, support his child, and thereby to protect the state from the
expense of maintaining it.4
In 1923 the Legislature amended Ohio G. C. Sec. 12123, elimi-
nating the provision for maintenance of the bastard child, and in-
serting, in lieu thereof, a provision that the defendant pay the
complainant such sum as the court may find to be necessary "for
her support, maintenance and necessary expenses, caused by preg-
nancy and childbirth together with costs of prosecution." " It will
be observed that it was only for the complainant's support that the
defendant was charged, and not with the support of the bastard
child." This amendment, however, in no way extinguished the
liability of the reputed father to support his illegitimate child, for it
contained a proviso to the effect that it should not be construed as a
bar to the prosecution of the accused for failure to support his
illegitimate child under provisions of other statutes.' In conjunc-
tion with this proviso, the Juvenile Court Code, Ohio G. C. Sec.
1639-46, which previously provided only for the support of legiti-
mate children, was amended to provide also for illegitimate children. 8
2So, State ex e s. B~cbe v. Cow ley, 116 Ohio St. 377, 156 N. E. 214 (1927); Hoffer
v. Whit.:, 53 Ohio App. 187, 4 N. E. (2d) 595 (1936); Commonwealth v. Domes, 239
ML-s. 592, 132 N. E. 363 (1921); ?Joncreif v. Ely, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 405 (1857); 5
1lz)o Juc.. "B3t1,nrv," c,:. 4; 4 VrzsR:¢xzs, AMESICA-. FAMIL" LAws (1936) 206.
3I 24, Rr~v. STAT., SS,'in and Critchfield, Vol. I (1860) p. 178.
'.Sce Statu ex ,al. I1ebc v. Cowley, 116 Ohio St., 377, 156 N. E. 214 (1927); Dimmit
v. Sta., 112 Ohio St. 691, 148 N. E. 90 (1925); McKelvy v. State, 87 Ohio St. 1, 99
\'. E. 1076 (1912); Musser v. Stu%%art, 21 Ohio St. 353 (1891); Hawes v. Cooksey, 13
Ohio 242 (1'44); Walker v. Chandkr, 15 Ohio App. 292 (1921).
Onzo G. C., .icc. 12123, as anitaded in 110 Ohio L. 296 (1923).
*-Sec State cx rJ. Bchkb V. Cow.ley, 116 Ohio St. 377, 156 N. E. 214 (1927); Pummel
%. Stt. cx r.cl. Hill, 22 Ohio App. 340 (1926).
STIe, provit o clae stata, "Pro,'-idd, however, that nothing in this section shall be
construed as a bar ti7 the proqcution of the accused for failure to support his illegiti-
mate child or children undtr the1 provisions of any statute providing for prosecution and
punishment for non-support of lkgitimate or illegitimate children."
sOHio G. C., see. 1639-46 provides, "whoever being the father of an illegitimate
child under the age of ti:-tn ytars and able to support or contribute to the support of
ouch child. fails, negltcta or refu es Fo to do . . . shall be fined . . . etc.; provided, if he
b .ll pay tach v.tJ: for Euch purrose to the court, or to a trustee . . ., sentence may be
'lp~ended." S,'c Creisar v. Stat, 97 Ohio St. 16 (1917) for holding that the above
-ection pd,,r to 11023 provided ,nly for legitimate children.
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Likewise, the Criminal Code charged the putative father with main-
tenance of the illegitimate child."
The-principal case interprets the 1938 amendment of Ohio G. C.
Sec. 12123, which, after a lapse of fifteen years, reincorporated
within the Bastardy Act the provision for maintenance of the bas-
tard child by the putative father.' It provides that "if the child is
alive" the father shall pay for the expenses of pregnancy and child-
birth, and, in addition, "a reasonable weekly sum to be paid com-
plainant for support and maintenance of said child up to eighteen
years of age." It further provides that "in event said child is not
born alive, or is not living" at the time of adjudication, defendant
shall pay expenses of pregnancy and childbirth, and, in addition, "a
reasonable amount for maintenance of said child until its death.
and its funeral expenses." 11 It will be noted that the 1938 amend-
ment superimposed on the existing statute, providing for the mother
her expenses of pregnancy and childbirth, these provisions for
maintenance of the bastard child.
Courts of other states have held that the provision for mainte-
nance, in bastardy acts, may secure to the complainant reimburse-
ment for the past as well as payment for the future support of the
bastard child.'2 Likewise, in Ohio, prior to the 1923 amendment of
Ohio G. C. Sec. 12123, there is indication -that the maintenance from
date of birth could be recovered.' 3  In Hinton v. Dickinson,'4 where
0 Otzo G. C., sec. 13008, et seq.; also see 1927 Ohio A. G. Opus., p. 912; but cf.,
1917 Ohio A. G. Opus., Vol. II p. 1687.
"0 117 Ohio L. 808 (S. B. 396) (1938).
1 OHio G. C. see. 12123 now reads, "If, in person or by counsel, the accused con-
fesses in the court that the accusation is true or, if the jury find him guilty, he shall be
adjudged the reputed father of the illegitimate child if said child is alive, and the court
shall thereupon adjudge that he pay to the complainant such sum as the court may find
to be necessary for her support, maintenance, and necessary expenses caused by preg-
nancy and childbirth together with costs of prosecution, and a reasonable weekly sum
to be paid complainant for support and maintenance of said child up to eighteen years
of age. In event said child is not born alive, or is not living at the time of plea or find-
ing of guilty, the court shall order the accused to pay to the complainant such sum as
the court may find to be necessary for her support, maintenance and necessary expenses
caused by pregnancy, including therein a reasonable amount for maintenance of said child
until its death, and funeral expenses ... .
" Spieger v. State, 32 Wis. 400 (1873); Hoffman v. State, 17 Wis. 596 (1863); see
Woodbury v. Wilson, 133 Me. 329, 177 A. 708 (1935); Smith v. Lint, 37 Me. 546 (1854);
State v. Beatty, 66 N. C. 648 (1872); Kyne v. Kyne, 100 P. (2d) 806 (1940); Tennant v.
Brookover 12 V. Va. 337 (1878); 56 Am. Dec. 221 (1884); 3 R. C. L. 767.
1" In Ely v. Ott, 14 Ohio C. C. 619, 7 Ohio C. D. 677 (1897), it was held a judgment
of $1,300, was not unreasonable. The amount was to be paid in installments. At the time
of adjudication the child was four years old, and evidence was presented to the court
regarding the support and. maintenance of the child up to the time of the action, such
evidence being considered by the court in determining the sum stated above.
14 Hinton v. Dickinson, 19 Ohio St. 583 (1869).
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the illegitimate child died after the bastardy proceeding was begun,
a judgment for $150 was affirmed. The reason advanced for the
holding, in this early case, that the death of the child did not abate
prosecution under the Bastardy Act, was that the mother was en-
titled to reimbursement for such items as costs of prosecution, birth
expenses, burial expenses, and caring for the child from the time of
birth until death.
The Hinton case was decided when the Bastardy Act was held
to be for the benefit of the state rather than for the benefit of the
mother. Being a liberal decision to the liking of the Legislature, it
was codified and became part of the Bastardy Act.'5  This provision
was repealed in 1923, however. Its elimination from the Bastardy
.\ct would not necessarily have been significant since recovery under
the Act was changed to provide only for the mother's expenses, ex-
clusive of maintenance for the child.' With respect to such re-
covery a provision that the action should not abate on the death of
the child is, of course, unnecessary.' 7  But the failure to provide
for non-abatement in the event of the child's death in the Juvenile
Court Code, to which the provision for maintenance of the illegiti-
mate child, was, in effect, transferred, is significant. Such a pro-
vision may be superfluous, other things being equal, as indicated by
the court in the Hinton case. But, where the provision has once
been in the statute and is subsequently eliminated, there is at least
a possible inference that the recovery of maintenance expense, as
opposed to the expenses of the mother, was not to be permitted
when the child had died. In view of the close relation of the prob-
lem., this inference may also extend to the right to recover for
maintenance of a living child prior to the adjudication. There is,
therefore, reason for saying that, after 1923 and prior to 1938, re-
covery in case of a living child should be limited to maintenance
after adjudication, and it was so held.' 8 If this is true, then the
,*,,urt, in the instant case, had good grounds for emphasizing the
' In 75 Ohio Las 742, ,c. 16 (1878) it states, "The death of a bastard child shall
w.t 1, cau-e of abatement, or bar to a prosecution for bastardy, if the mother is living;
Nut t1h court trying the casu shall, on conviction, take the death into consideration and
,vy judgment for such sum as it decms just, the payment of which, or security therefore,
may be enforced as above provided."
"In State ex rcl. Beebe v. Cowley, 116 Ohio St. "377, 156 N. . 214 (1927) it was
hbd that the complainant could not recover for maintenance from date of birth to date
of adjudication under the Bastardy Act.
11 Stat' e,- re. Dicus v. Van Dorn, 56 Ohio App. 82, 8 Ohio 0. 393, 10 N. E. (2d)
14 (1937); Scldnright v. Jenins. 7 Ohio 0. 127 (1936).
v, Ste ne 16. supra.
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distinction in the present statute between the living child and the
dead child, and pointing out that the Legislature adopted apt words
to prescribe for maintenance from birth, only in the case where the
child dies before adjudication.
The court did not, however, refer to this legislative history, and
looking at the provisions as they now read, it may as reasonably be
inferred that the Legislature did not insert the provisions into the
statute in the case of the living child, that recovery be from birth.
because it thought it was superfluous, and inserted it in the case of
the dead child out of an abundance of caution.
The court's principal argument, however, is that the Bastardy
Act modified the common law which imposes no liability on the
reputed father, therefore it must be strictly interpreted.' Ac-
cordingly, until the defendant is adjudged the putative father, he
has no liability. With respect to this factor the court could have
just as easily held the other way. The common law was early re-
jected in Ohio in this situation. Ever since 1824 the putative father
has been charged with the liability of supporting his illegitimate
child."0  The Act for the Maintenance of Minors. Ohio G. C. Secs.
I3OO8-I3O2I, and the older bastardy acts, viz. prior to 1923, were
considered as having identical purposes, that is to compel persons
charged by the law with support of designated dependents to meet
the full measure of their obligation to such dependents."' Ohio G. C.
Sec. I3OO8 makes failure to support an illegitimate child a felony.
Ogg v. State' 2 holds that an indictment under this section need not
allege that in a previous proceeding, under the Bastardy Act, the
accused had been adjudged to be the putative father of such child.
Therefore, it must be admitted that the liability is charged the pu-
tative father even before he is adjudged the putative father. 3
Because these statutes have imposed this liability consistently,
and continuously since the beginning of the nineteenth century, it
is improbable that the Legislature intended to limit the liability-of
19See State ex rel. Beebe v. Cowley, 116 Ohio St. 377, 156 N. E. 214 (1927); 5
Ouio JuR., "Bastardy," sec. 7.
-, The first Bastardy Act was passed in 1824. See note 3, supra.
ILcKelvy v. State, 87 Ohio St. 1, 99 N. E. 1076 (1912); Gillette v. State, IS Ohio
App. 360, motion to certify record overruled in 20 Ohio L. Rep. 4; see State %f. Veres,
75 0. S. 138, 78 N. E. 1005 (1906).
2 Ogg v. State, 73 Ohio St. 59, 75 N. E. 943 (1905).
1 See Seaman v. State, 106 Ohio St. 177, 140 N. E. 108 (1922) where in a pro-
ceeding under Ohio G. C. sec. 13008, the putative father of a bastard child paid to the clerk
of court a sum certain, "beirg the amtount of accumulated arrcarage from the day of the
birth of the child to the day wrhen the court made the order,"
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the putative father, in case the child is alive at the adjudication, to
support only from that date. It is very unlikely that it was intended
to thus place a premium on the ability of the accused to delay the
commencement of the action or the adjudication thereof. Since
support of the bastard child by the reputed father until it is eighteen
years old is the essence of the bastardy proceeding, it seems unwise,
in the light of what has been discussed above, for the court to im-
pose such limitation upon this obligation.
M. D. D.
POWER OF COURT TO 'MODIFY DECREE FOR SUPPORT
WHICH I NCORPORA.TES AGREEMENT OF PARTIES
The court incorporated into a divorce decree the principal pro-
visions of a separation agreement, providing for a property settle-
ment and for specified monthly payments by the father for the sup-
port of his minor child. Subsequently the father moved the court to
ater the decree so as to reduce the amount payable for support, on
the ground of changed conditions. Held, that the court had no au-
thority to reduce the amount ordered in the decree, as to do so would
be to impair the obligation of a contract.'
In the absence of such a coitract between the spouses, it is gen-
erally acknowledged that a court of equity may, upon proper allega-
tions of the changed conditions and circumstances of the parties,
modify the decree, either by increasing or decreasing the allowance.-
In the holding in the principal case. the Supreme Court of Ohio
went against the great weight of authority in Anerica,^ but was not
I Tlli v. T Ul1 . 13; Ohij , St. l,7. Ohio Par May 5, 1941).
Monahan v. Mvnahan, 14 Ohio App. 116 (1921); Connolly v. Connolly, 16 Ohio App.
'12 (1922); Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St. 499, 3 N. E. 354 (1885); 3feissner v. Meissner,
11 Ohio C. C. 1, 5 Ohio C. D. 305 (I95); Baker v. Baker, 4 Ohio App. 170, 21 Ohio
C. C. (N.S.) 590. 60 V. L. Bull. 25 (1915); Smcdley v. State, 95 Ohio St. 141, 115
N. E. 1 22 (1916); Sager v. Sager, 5 Ohio App. 489, 26 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 522, 37 Ohio
t-. C. 559 (1916). The rule has been recognized in Clough v. Long, 8 Ohio App. 420, 28
ohio C. A. 423, 40 Ohio C. C. 185, 63 W. L. Bull. 205 (1918); Garver v. Garver, 102
Ohio St. 443, 133 X. E. 551 (1921). See annotation in 71 A. L. R. 723, and cases cited
r in.
8 Pryor v. Pryor, 88 Ark. 302, 129 Am. St. Rep. 102, 114 S. W. 700 (1908); Herrick
Herrick, 319 Ill. 14f,, 149 N. E. 820 (1925); Maginnis v. 'Maginnis, 323 III. 113, 153
N. E. 654 (1926); Langrall v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 125 Atl. 695, 37 A. L. R. 437
(1924); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 166 lich. 248, 141 N, W. 542 (1911); Kelly v. Kelly, 194
Mich. 94, 160 N. W. 397 (1916); Warren v. Warren, 116 Minn. 458, 133 N. W. 1009
(1912); Connttt v. Connett, 81 Neb. 777, 116 N. IV. 658 (1908); Wallace v. Wallace,
74 N. H. 256, 67 Atl. 580 (1907); Le Beau v. Le Beau, 80 N. H. 139, 114 At]. 28
(1921). For other authorities and statement of the general rule see annotations in 58
A I, R. 63o and 1Wo A. L. R. 10, '.
